[interesting] Database Encryption

[Robert Brenstein]

>on 1/23/03 7:58 AM, Peter McConachie at pmccon at bigpond.net.au wrote:
>
>>
>>>>  I can see that the simplest scheme is to encrypt only current tables and
>>>>  fields - totally ignoring the rest.
>>>
>>>  Explain this point please.
>>
>>  What I was trying to say was that I imagine "that you currently encrypt only
>>  current tables and fields - totally ignoring the rest". This is obviously
>>  what you do.
>
>Which rest ???
>
>Which you have deleted ???
>
>I see what you mean.
>
>Yes I do not encrypt all space of database.
>Only DATA.
>

But from your earlier posts I gather that DATA above means data in 
the current records/fields only. If I understood that correctly, then 
records that are deleted still contain data that may be private but 
becomes exposed now since they are not encrypted anymore.

You mentioned the option to zero (I presume you mean to nullify) 
deleted records in version 2. Shouldn't that be done automatically 
for encrypted tables and fields? Optional for other cases is fine. Or 
you should continue to encrypt the deleted records/fields.

Further, I am not sure whether you want to wait until version 2 to 
resolve this. You would not want to get into a scandal like Microsoft 
exposing inappropriate content within Word files. Theoretically, we 
should explicitely nullify all records/fields that we delete in such 
a database, but in practice we may rely on automatic deletion or 
simply forget to do it.

While you may not be legally liable for damages, reputation of 
Valentina could be impacted. Wouldn't you agree, Lynn?

Robert